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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Farmer v. Brennan:
PRISON OFFICIALS
MAY BE HELD
LIABLE UNDER
THE EIGHTH
AMENDMENT FOR
"DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE" TO
AN INMATE'S
HEALTH AND
SAFETY IN PRISON
CONDITION
CLAIMS.

In Farmer v. Brennan,
114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994), the
United States Supreme Court
held that a prison official may be
held accountable under the
Eighth Amendment for knowing and disregarding a substantial risk of harm faced by an
inmate. In so ruling, the Court
established the subjective elements of the "deliberate indifference" test used to determine
whether prison officials violate
the Eighth Amendment for failure to prevent harm in prison
condition claims.
Petitioner Dee Farmer
("Farmer") was a transsexual
serving a prison sentence in an
all-male federal prison for creditcard fraud. Farmer, a biological
male, had undergone treatment
for silicone breast implants and
unsuccessful black market surgery to have his testicles removed. Despitehisovertlyfeminine characteristics, and his previous segregation at a different
federal prison because of safety
concerns, prison officials at the
United States Penitentiary in
Terre Haute, Indiana, ("USPTerre Haute") after an initial
stay in administrative segregation, housed him in the general
population of that maximumsecurity prison. Farmer voiced
no objection to either the-transfer from the Federal Correctional Institute in Oxford, Wisconsin ("FCI-Oxford") or to
his placement in the general
population at USP-Terre Haute.
Less than two weeks after his
placement in the general population, Farmer was beaten and
raped by another inmate. He

reported the incident and several days later officials returned
him to segregation.
Farmer filed a Bivens
complaint, alleging a violation
of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth
Amendment. He contended that
Respondents, in their official
capacity as warden and Director of the Bureau of prisons,
either transferred him to USPTerre Haute or placed him in its
general population despite
knowledge that he was a transsexual proj ecting feminine characteristics, and was particularly
vulnerable to sexual attack by
some inmates. Farmer asserted
that this amounted to a deliberately indifferent failure to protecthis safety, and thus, a violation of his rights under the
EighthAmendment. He sought
compensatory and punitive damages and an injunction barring
future confinement in any penitentiary.
Respondents filed a
motion for summary judgment
in the United States District
Court for the Western District
ofWisconsin. The district court
held that there could be deliberate indifference to Farmer's
safety only if prison officials
were reckless in a criminal sense,
meaning that they had actual
knowledge of a potential danger. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
affirmed without opinion. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the inconsistency
among lower appellate court deCISIOns.

The Court began its
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analysis by taking a logical and
analytical progression through
case precedent that culminated
in the Court's determination that
prison rape was not constitutionally tolerable. In short,
prison officials could be held
liable for failure to prevent harm
under the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause of the Eighth
Amendment. Farmer; 114 S.
Ct. at 1976 (citations omitted).
The Court made it clear
that "[a] prison official's deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to an
inmate violates the Eighth
Amendment." Id. at 1974 (citations omitted). In acknowledging that prison conditions
may be "restrictive and even

harsh," the Court emphasized
that prison officials have the
duty to protect inmates from
harm at the hands of other prisoners. Id. at 1976-77 (quoting
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.
337,347 (1981)).
The Court was careful
to point out however, that not
every injury suffered by an inmate reaches constitutional dimension and imposes liability
on prison officials.
Stating two necessary
requirements for a constitutional
violation ofthe Eighth Amendment, the Court determined that
firstthe deprivation alleged must
be objectively "sufficiently serious," subjecting the inmate to
substantial risk of serious harm.

Id. at 1977 (quoting Wilson v.
Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298
(1991)). Further, the Court
noted that an exploration into
the mindset ofprison officials is
necessary as well, thereby adding a subjective component to
cruel and unusual punishment
inquiries. Id. (citing Wilson,
501 U.S. at 302-03).
In defining the term deliberate indifference, the Court
observed that the phrase encompasses conduct more blameworthy than negligence.
Farmer, 114 S. Ct. at 1978.
Rejecting a high malicious standard, as well as a civil law definitionofrecklessness, the Court
adopted a SUbjective recklessness requirement as applied in
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the criminal law because it was
a familiar and workable standard consistent with the Court's
interpretation of the Cruel and
UnusualPunishmentClause. Id
at 1980.
In rejecting Farmer's
claim that prison officials would
be free to ignore obvious dangers to inmates, the Court instructed that under the subjective test adopted, a claimant
need not show that a prison
official acted or failed to act
believing that harm would befall
an inmate; it was enough that
the official acted or failed to act
despite his knowledge of a substantial risk ofserious harm. Id.
at 1981. Furthermore, the Court
observed that a prison official
could not escape liability by
showing that while he was aware
of an obvious substantial risk to
an inmate's safety, he did not
know that the inmate would be
assaulted by a specific person.
Id. at 1982. On the other hand,
even if the official actually knew
of a substantial risk and responded reasonably, he could
not be held liable even ifthe risk
was not averted. Id. at 198283.
The Court found
unpersuasive Farmer's argument that the use of the subjective test would bar prospective
relief and require inmates to
unjustly suffer a physical injury
before obtaining court ordered
correction of objectively inhumane prison conditions. Id. at
1983. The Court referred to
long settled case law which established that "one does not
have to await consummation of

threatened injury to obtain preventative relief." Id. at 1983
(quoting Pennsylvania v. West
Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 593
(1923)).
The Court then focused
on Farmer's request for injunctive relief and enumerated the
requirements that must be satisfied by an inmate seeking prospective relief. First, both the
objective and subjective requirements must be satisfied.
Farmer, 114 S. Ct. at 1983.
The Court instructed that the
subjective factor should be determined based on the current
attitudes and conduct of prison
officials at the time suit is brought
and thereafter. Id at 1983-84.
Second, the inmate must adequately plead the issue. In
order to survive summary j udgment, evidence must be produced from which it can be inferred that at the time suit was
filed and at the time ofsummary
judgment, the official knowingly
and unreasonably disregarded
an objectively intolerable risk of
harm and would continue to do
so. Id.
Finally, the Court considered whether the district
court's disposition of Farmer's
complaint comported with
Eighth Amendment principles.
Id. at 1984-85. The Court found
that in granting summary judgment to Respondents, the district court may have placed decisive weight on Farmer's failure to notify Respondents of a
risk of harm. Id. at 1985. The
Court emphasized that failure
to give notice was not dispositive
of Farmer's claims for damages

and injunctive relief. Id. Thus,
the Supreme Court reversed the
court of appeals' decision and
ordered the district court on
remand to reconsider its denial
of Farmer's discovery motion
and apply the principles explained in its decision.
Faithful to its precedent,
the United States Supreme
Court in Farmer v. Brennan
developed the subjective elements ofdeliberate indifference,
without creating new obstacles
for prisoners to overcome. The
Court's decision is a practical,
clear, and consistent standard
forIowercourtstofollow. While
the opinion is restrictive, to some
extent, it makes clear that prison
rape is constitutionally intolerable under the Eighth Amendment. Prison officials may be
held responsible for this inhumane prison condition ifthe official was aware ofthe risk and
failed to take reasonable measures to abate it. Prisoners are
now empowered with the means
to successfully challenge the
response of prison officials to
the dehumanizing and volatile
conditions of prison rape, long
tolerated and long known to
exist.
- Ruth G. Allen
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